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Redefining Community in a Glo bal City : 
Tokyo Metropolitan Government in the 21st Century 
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At a time when metropolitan governments have been weakened or dismant1ed， 
Tokyo Metropolitan Government (TMG) exemplifies the model of integrated met-
ropolitan government. Yet. TMG is at a cross-roads. The 23 special wards (ku)， 
administrative units of TMG， are demanding greater local autonomy. The central 
government seeks to devolve administrative and fiscal policy while retaining cen-
tral authority. Efforts to bring about balanced growth and limit over concentra-
tion are meeting with limited success while the metropolis continues to expand 
outwards. As the millenium approaches， Tokyo finds itself constrained by the 
economic slump and associated fiscal strain. 
This paper reports on a case study of changing intergovernmental relations in 
Tokyo. 
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“In approaching the problem of the efficient management of a given city 
the first question which arises is this:‘Does the jurisdiction or authority 
of the city government extend over the entire urban area it serves?' " 
Charles Beard (1923， p.26) 
1. Introduction 
“Today， with the increasing centralization and concentration of power 
in the nation-state， a 'new politics'.. must be structured institutionally 
around the restoration of power by municipalities. This is not only 
necessary but possible even in such gigantic urban areas as New York 
City， Montreal， London and Paris. Such agglomerations are not， strictly 
speaking， cities or municipalities in the traditional senses of those terms， 
despite being designated as such by sociologists." Murray Bookchin (1995， 
pp.261・62)
Urban expansion has not been followed by extension of city boundaries. Metropolitan gov-
ernment has been an elusive goal， not just in the U.S.， but world-wide (see Barlow 1991， Rothblatt 
'Department of Political Science. University of Louisville 
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and Sancton 1993， Sharpe 1995， Savitch and Vogel 1996). Calls for metropolitan reform have 
usually been couched in terms of the need for unification of the central city with the surround-
ing suburbs (i.e.， consolidation). Greater centralization is proposed as a solution to the problems 
facing inner cities whether fiscal， social， or economic (e.g.， Rusk 1993). Of course， there has been 
a counter position， that of public choice， which argues that local government fragmentation (i.e.， 
decentralization) is good， not bad and facilitates economy and efficiency in the delivery of public 
services. The public choice school received the endorsement of the Advisory Commission on 
Intergovernmental Relations in the 1980s (ACIR 1993). The debate over metropolitan govern-
ment ebbed as consolidation efforts failed， especially in the U.S. and a number of notable cases of 
metropolitan government were dismantled， for example， London. 
In the last few years， there has been renewed interest in metropolitan governance. Although 
some cal for the traditional consolidation approach (Rusk 1993)， more innovative solutions in-
volved metropolitan governance arrangements linking local governments (cities， counties) and 
non-governmental or private actors (e.g.， public-private partnerships) to create a system of met-
ropolitan governance (see Barlow 1991， Peirce et. al 1993， Savitch and Vogel 1996; Lefevre 1998). 
There has been somewhat of a paradigm shift in the debate over metropolitan government. 
In the past， the issue was whether to centralize or decentralize. Today， the problem is how to 
both centralize and decentralize at the same time， that is to go bigger and smal1er. On the one 
hand， itis thought that greater centralization or more properly， coordination， isneeded for city-
regions to compete in the global economy， cooperate on urban development and planning and 
share the cost of large-scale infrastructure projects. On the other hand， over-centralization can 
result in large bureaucracies that are too rigid to respond quickly to a rapidly changing environ-
ment and are far removed from the daily life of citizens. Thus， there has been concern with how 
to retain community and local control while gaining the advantages of greater coordination. 
In this paper， 1 examine proposed changes in the governing arrangements of Tokyo Metro-
politan Government (TMG) that should lead to a more decentrali 
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Professor William Robson's recommendations contained in his “Report on Tokyo Metropoli-
tan Government" (1967) are stil relevant today3). Professor Robson called for TMG's boundaries 
to extend as much as 50 to 110 kilometers from central Tokyo to capture the commuting popu-
lation (p.1). If this was infeasible， he called for the creation of a ]oint Council made up of TMG 
and the seven adjacent prefects which would carry out strategic planning (p.12). He saw no 
reason for a separate system of local government in the Tama district. He called for elimination 
of the existing Special Wards and the creation of a new ward system with population in each 
ranging from 250，000 and 500，000 persons (pp.l4-15). 
2. Tokyo - an Overview 
Tokyo is one of the few global cities governed by a metropolitan government (Sharpe 195)4). 
]apan is a highly centralized nation and population， industry， and finance have concentrated in 
the capital Tokyo. The concentration of business and finance on top of the political functions 
associated with being the nation's capital has led to an overconcentration in the central wards of 
Tokyo. Office building in the boom 1980s period crowded out residential housing and led to 
skyrocketing land values as speculators and builders bid up the prices5). Tokyo has also seen the 
influx of international organizations (ngos) associated with its emergence as a global city. As Dr. 
Togo， Director General of the Tokyo Institute for Municipal Research explains， the major difi-
culties facing Tokyo are how to foster balanced growth and a decentralized or multi-centered 
metropolis to reduce housing shortages， traffic congestion， and waste disposal problems that 
arise from over-concentration (1995， pp.184-201). There is also recognition that TMG is too 
centralized administratively leading to efforts to decentralize authority and devolve services 
and functions to the ward level. 
What we refer to as Tokyo consists of the 23 special wards (ku) (the old city of Tokyo， after 
the amalgamation in 1932)， the Tama district (western suburbs) containing 26 cities， five towns and 
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Figure 1 Tokyo Metropolis and Surrounding Prefectures 
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Tokyo Metropolitan Government. 197. Tokyo: Services for Today and Challenges for Tomorrow， p.9-1O 
Figure 2 Administrative Districts of Tokyo Metropolis 
one village， and a number of islands scattered in the Pacific Ocean (see map) (TMG， 1997. p.7)6). 
The City of Tokyo and the Tokyo Prefecture were consolidated to form Tokyo Metropolitan 
Government in 1943. Table 1 reports the population for the 23 wards， that is the old city of 
Tokyo; the current metropolitan city of Tokyo that is within the boundaries of TMG; and the 
larger Tokyo metropolitan region including the neighboring three prefectures of Saitama. 
Kanagawa， and Chiba. In 1995. Tokyo had nearly 12 million people; the 23 wards account for just 
under 8 million or about two-thirds of the population. The Tokyo metropolitan region had a 
population of about 32.5 million people with Tokyo making up about one-third of the regional 
population. The density in the 23 special wards is 13，000 per square kilometer; in Tama the 
density is 3，250 per square kilometer (TMG 1997， pp.ll-12). 
The population of the wards varies from fewer than 40，000 to over 600，000 (see Table 2). For 
the last several decades. the wards have been loosing population. However. the latest census 
figures indicate that in 1997， the wards actually gained 8，400 persons. This is likely due to 
cheaper land prices and less jobs outside of Tokyo related to the economic troubles (The Daily 
Yomiuri， March 30. 1998， p.3). These figures do not take into account commuters. In 1990. the 
daytime population of Tokyo was just under 14.5 million and about 11.3 million in the 23 wards 
(TMG 1997. pp.16-18). 
3. TMG Administrative Structure 
In 1943， the City of Tokyo and Tokyo Prefecture were consolidated as part of the “wartime 
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Table 1 Changes in Population， Tokyo Region (1000 persons) 
Year Tokyo Region Tokyo 23・ku Tama area Three 
neighboring 
prefedures 
1960 17，860 9.680 8.310 1，370 8.180 
1965 ~1 ，02Q 10，870 8.890 1.980 10，150 
1970 ~4 ， 110 11.410 8，840 2，570 12.710 
1975 27.040 11.670 8.650 3.030 15，3I() 
1980 28.700 1，620 8，350 3.270 17，08J) 
1985 30.270 11.830 8.350 3.480 18.440 
1990 31.800 11.860 8.160 3，6~0 19.940 
1995 32.570 1，770 7.970 3，800 20，800 
2000 ~3 ，52~ 1，730-11，810 7，800-7，900 3.910-3.930 21.790 
2005 34.290 1，680-11，810 7，630-7，81Q 4，000-4，050 22，610 
2010 34.730 1 !~0-11 ，740 7.420-7.690 4，050-4，130 23.180 
2015 34.790 1，400-11，660 7.240-7.590 4.070-4.160 23.390 
Reproduced from: Bureau of City Planning， Tokyo Metropolitan Government， Urban White Paper of Tokyo 
Metropolis 1996 (Tokyo: author)， p.14. 
Table 2 Population of Wards， 1990 
Percent change from 
Ward 1990 popu'ation 1985 
23・ku 8，163，573 -2.3 
Chiyoda-ku ~9 ，47~ -21.8 
Chuo・ku 68.041 -14.9 
Minato-ku 158，499 -18.5 
Shinjuku・ku ~96，790 -10.8 
Bunkyo・.ku ~1 ，2E)~ -7.5 
Taito・ku ~2，9~ -7.8 
Sumida-ku 222，944 -3.1 
Koto-ku ~5，1~~ -1ρ 
Shinaaawa-ku 344.611 -3.7 
Meguro-ku 251.222 -6.7 
ota-ku 647.914 -2.2 
Setagaya-ku ~9，051 -2.7 
Shibuya・ku 205.625 -15.2 
Nakano-ku ~9，681 -4.8 
$JlQinami-ku 529.485 -1.9 
Toshima-ku ~61 ，87Q -6.0 
Kita-ku 354，647 -3.5 
Arakawa・ku 184.809 -2.8 1 
Itabashi-ku 518.943 if子Nerima-ku 618，663 
Adachi-ku E)31，163 1.41 
Katsushika・ku 424，801 1.4 1 
Edogawa・ku ~65 ，9:.i~ 9.9 I 
NOTE: Wards inbold face are the seven most central wards. The three wards 
identified in bold and italics contain the central business district. 
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centralization policies: Prior to this. the city had an elected mayor and the prefecture had an 
appointed governor7). The new Metropolis of Tokyo was governed by Tokyo Metropolitan 
Government (TMG). After the war ended. TMG continued to be a strong metropolitan govern-
ment although election of the governor was introduced. There was no significant movement 
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towards decentralizing TMG until the 1974 reforms providing for direct local election of ward 
mayors. Prior to this， the mayors were appointed by the governor and the wards were entirely 
subordinate administrative units. (Shibata 1993). The 23 wards (ku)， the original City of Tokyo， 
were considered special urban governments and unique to the Tokyo prefecture. They lack 
many ordinary municipal powers which are exercised by TMG on their behalf. For instance， 
TMG provides fire protection， water supply， sewers， and sanitation services in the 23 wards. 
With the exception of fire protection， these services are provided by the municipalities in the 
Tama area (see Shibata 1993; Togo 1995; TMG 1997). 
The special wards and TMG also have unique financial arrangements. Some revenues nor-
mally collected by municipalities -resident tax， fixed asset tax， property tax -are collected by 
TMG inside the 23 wards and redistributed through a financial adjustment scheme助. The total 
tax collected from these three taxes is divided between TMG and the ward offices. The percent-
age split is set at 44 percent to the wards ("basic adjustment amount") and the remaining 56 
percent for TMG. Each ward calculates its revenue and expenditures needed to provide basic 
services. Wards with surpluses place the excess in a surplus fund that gets added to the general 
allocation fund. Wards with deficits receive an additional subsidy to cover the shortage. During 
the bubble economy， several wards had surpluses which went to the fund. For example， in1990 
Shibuya contributed ￥1，981 millions to the adjustment fund (TMG 1997， p.31; Shibata 1993). This 
financial adjustment equalizes resources and ensures a uniform level of services across the 23 
wards making up central Tokyo. 
4. Proposed Reforms to Decentralize TMG 
The special ward system (Tokubetsu-ku) in Tokyo is unique in ]apan. The relationship 
between TMG and the wards differs from that of other prefectures and ordinance-designated 
cities9). The division of responsibilities and financing of services between TMG and the wards 
also differs from that of TMG and local governments in the Tama district. TMG provides some 
services directly in the wards that are elsewhere considered municipal services. The special wards 
are administrative subdivisions of TMG. In 1974， the wards' powers were enhanced by 1) pro-
viding for direct election of ward mayors， 2)transferring health services and building control to 
the ward offices， and 3) abolishing the system for posting of TMG 0任icialsto ward offices (TMG 
1997， p.30). The wards recovered their personnel management authority and set up an indepen-
dent Personnel Commission. However， the wards stil had rather limited autonomy. 
In 1990， TMG and the ward offices asked the central government for reorganization of the 
metropolitan governing system. This resulted in the 22nd Local System Research Council re-
port proposing “reform [that] will expand the scope of business to be conducted by the special 
wards and will make them more independent vis会vis"TMG. With this charge， TMG and the 
ward offices set up a Metropolis-Ward Council to study and recommend changes in the way the 
metropolis was governed. In 1992 an interim report was issued; in 1994 a draft final report was 
released， submitted to the Ministry of Home Affairs and endorsed. In 1998， the wards and TMG 
accepted the final report and it was approved by the cabinet and passed by the Diet. The report 
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calls for transferring some services and revenues to the wards and greater self-governance for 
the wards beginning in the year 2000. When implemented. the wards will become fully autono-
mous municipalities and no longer have a special status as wards. However. the wards will have 
to act as other municipalities and be more self-reliant. TMG will no longer carry out ordinary 
municipal services and it will become more focused on regional problemslO). A further report is 
due on changing the financing system between TMG and the ward offices. 
According to the Tokyo Metropolis-Ward Council. two factors were propelling reform. First. 
national policy was promoting decentralization and local autonomy. However. efforts to decen-
tralize TMG governance pre-date national reforms. More importantly. according to the report. 
there was a need for greater ward autonomy to provide better quality services. to lead to more 
balanced development in Tokyo. and to provide greater self-governance. Existing arrangements 
between TMG and the ward offices contributed to confusion about which government was 
responsible for services. a lack of accountability to citizens. weak local (ward) governments. and 
a lack of focus by TMG on regional problems. policies. and administration. To remedy this 
situation. basic municipal services provided by TMG will be transferred to the ward offices. the 
wards will gain greater fiscal control. and TMG will be reoriented as the first-tier government in 
a more sharply delineated two-tier metropolitan system of government. The movement towards 
greater ward autonomy was accelerated by the 1974 reform to directly elect ward mayors 
(interview). 
Many issuesneed to be addressed by the ward offices. TMG and the central government to 
implement the reforms including revision of the Local Autonomy Law. the basic act setting up 
the framework of local governance nationally. Agreement on the general principles of reform 
occurred in 1990. Since then. TMG and the wards have sought to identify and recommend 
specific changes in policies and law and gain consensus among affected parties. Services to be 
transferred from TMG to the ward offices include waste management， city planning. education 
(offering right for assignment of teachers to schools)ll). aspects of septic tank regulation and 
sewerage services. The aim of the reform is to convert the wards into“basic local public bodies." 
5. Effects of Reform - a Decentralized Tokyo? 
Theoretically. these reforms should result in the wards becoming fully autonomous munici-
palities. However. there is doubt that the proposed reforms will be fully implemented and if 
implemented that they will have the desired effects. Among the obstacles is whether the wards 
have the institutional/technical capacity to perform al transferred services. whether sufficient 
financial resources will be transferred to the wards to pay for the services. and whether al 
services will actually be transferred given political barriers. Additionally. the current economic 
climate in ]apan may overshadow decentralization policies. Let us explore these obstacles to 
successful decentra1ization in more detail. 
Institutional/technical Capacity 
It is not clear that the wards have the institutional/technical capacity to accept the new 
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service responsibilities that will be transferred to themI2). For example. there has been litle 
examination of cost or changes in staffing levels needed in the wards to provide expanded city 
planning (interview). An oficial responsible for planning in a smaller ward estimated of the top 
of his head that the ward might need an additional 50 to 60 staff members to handle added 
responsibilities in planning. building control. and design management (interview). It is unclear 
how detailed these studies of costs and impacts are13). There is some doubt that the wards have 
sufficient staf. financial resources. and expertise to take over al aspects of city planning and 
other services amidst.pressure to reduce employment. (Under central government economy 
measures. local governments are to make personnel reductions and each ward has been alo-
cated a share by TMG). 
Finances 
Devolution of authority must be accompanied by fiscal reform. The present financing system 
for governing the Metropolis (TMG and the wards) places the wards in a subordinate position 
vis-a-vis TMG. However. there is some doubt as to whether sufficient financial resources will be 
transferred with the services. TMG is currently facing a fiscal crisis because of the economic 
recession and the land bubble burst. TMG revenues are declining while committed expendi-
tures are rising. TMG has committed to continue to transfer the basic adjustment amount 
(currently 44 percent of three municipal taxes collected by TMG) and the actual costs that are 
currently expended to provide transferred services. This would require the basic adjustment 
amount to increase to perhaps 50 percent to cover the approximately ￥200 billion additional 
service costs associated with providing transferred services (interview). 
TMG is in a position to dictate the amount of money transferred and it is unknown if it will 
agree to transfer 50 percent of the basic adjustment amount. Thus. the wards could face added 
responsibilities without needed revenues and without new tax sources to hire additional staff or 
fund service costs. Final recommendations by the Metropolis-Ward Council to reform the fiscal 
system will not occur until after services are transferred in the year 2000. The fear is that 
administrative reforms emanating from the central government and TMG (e.g. privatization and 
deregulation) may lead to real cuts in services at the ward level comparable to the U.S. example 
of Reagan's New Federalism program turnbacks promoted as devolution but experienced as 
program cuts. Increased municipal autonomy on paper may not be matched by real authority. 
In fact. wards could be in worse shape as they wiU be held accountable for municipal services that 
they cannot reasonably provide without commensurate cuts in other service areas (interviews). 
In addition. the wards would be responsible for determining any reallocation of tax money 
among themselves. As Table 3 reveals. the wards are heavily dependent upon the metropolis 
financial adjustment system which accounts for about one-fourth of al ward revenues. How-
ever. there is wide variation among the wards in how much of their local revenues are derived 
from this source ranging from as litle as 1 or 2 percent to as much as 40 percent. This could 
lead to intense municipal confl 
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Table 3 Allocation from Metropolis-23 ku Financial Adjustment System 
Ward Financial Percent of Financial Percent of 
Adjustment Ward Adjustment Ward 
Allocation， Revenues， Allocation， Revenues， 
1989-叩t￥thousa油)1989-90 1995-笛 t￥thous叩 ds)1995・笛
Chiyoda-ku 7.208.213 16.9 5.821.113 12.8 
Chuo・ku 18.963.600 34.0 20.696.231 28.8 
Minato-ku 601.345 0.8 2.167.519 2.3 
Shiniuku・ku 22.674.077 18.8 20.678.855 19.7 
Bunkvo・ku 12.571.278 20.7 16.681田6 20.2 
Taito-ku 27.809.639 36.0 22.598∞7 25.8 
Sumida-ku 30.274.763 39.2 37.727.811 36.2 
Koto-ku 39.556.019 41.6 41.990.978 34.6 
Shinagawa-ku 28.378.427 29.5 28.936.756 26.6 
Megro-ku 12.085.908 16.3 11.830.264 14.7 
Ota-ku 35，403，368 23.0 40，111，124 19.2 
~etagaya-ku 21.991.382 11.2 19.198.016 8.5 
ShibuVa-ku 1.043.185 1.6 4.092.712 5.3 
Nakano-ku 24.821.361 31.2 25.346.791 26.1 
Suginami-ku 21.391.544 17.4 22.335.191 16.1 
Toshima・ku 35.999.739 40.6 23.441.643 26.2 
Kita-ku 49.307.323 43.2 45.879.855 38目5
Arakawa・ku 29.392.932 45.1 34.043.474 39.2 
Itabashi-ku 42.875.894 31.7 43.555.889 29.9 
Nerima-ku 38.085.886 22.2 46.208.179 26.0 
Adachi-ku 67.587.090 39.2 71.911.524 33.5 
Katsushika-ku 48.027.299 40.2 51.026.666 35.6 
Edogowa-ku 53.163.214 37.1 64，670，391 37.5 
TOTAl 669.213.486 27.8 697.950.655 25.1 
Sour回:Training School of Ward 0汗ices，Handbook of Ward Office， 1992; 1998. 
on a consensual political culture. It is likely that TMG would have to mediate disputes among the 
wards in how to distribute these revenues to ensure equity and harmony in relations (interview). 
Likelihood of Service Transfers 
The recommended service transfers may not occur. The most politically volatile service 
change that would occur is the transfer of waste management to the ward offices. In ]apan. 
waste collection and disposal are considered municipal services. However. TMG current1y pro-
vides this service in the 23 wards14). Under reforms. the ward offices would take over this service 
by the year 2000. Each ward would be required to provide a waste disposal site; at present a 
number of wards including Shinjuku ward do not have such facilities. TMG would continue to 
provide technical and financial assistance for building facilities but the wards would be respon-
sible for maintenance and operations. This will impose a significant burden on the wards but it 
is generally accepted that autonomous municipalities must provide al services normally consid司
ered municipal services15). A major obstacle has been the sanitation union concern that it wi1 
loose bargaining power and see wages and benefits depressed. Rather than one contract with 
TMG. there would be 23 contracts with wards and some wards may opt to contract this service 
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out entirely to the private sector (interview). 
6. Creating Regional Governance for Tokyo? 
Aside from bolstering ward autonomy， the reforms are intended to improve regional decision 
making by reducing TMG involvement in municipal services and refocusing its attention on 
regional problems and issues. The present reform plan does not go far enough to turn Tokyo 
into a truly regional government (see Robson， 1967， ch. II). The existing framework for regional 
cooperation rests on an annual regional summit (the Metropolitan Summit) between the gover-
nors of Tokyo and the neighboring three prefects. The secretariat of this summit rotates among 
the governors and each may strike items from the agenda that they do not wish considered. 
The regional summit has not ackled any significant issue and has not proven an effective forum 
for regional decision making (interview). 
At this time， there is no concrete study or proposal for creating new regional institutions. 
adjusting TMG and ward boundaries. or eliminating the distinction between local governments 
in Tama and in the 23 ku area. However， there is some recognition of the need for improved 
regional decision making and an expectation that it will be addressed in a future study. Mr. 
Yuichiro Ito. an official in the Ministry of Home Affairs. indicates that a study will likely be 
undertaken to consider consolidation of special wards in central Tokyo and possible expansion of 
the 23 wards area to the Tama area as well as consideration of a better urban government 
system for ordinance-designated cities. 
There is one issue on the horizon which could potentially galvanize cooperation at least 
among the four prefects with the summit serving as a base for cooperation. That is the pro-
posed relocation of the capital away from Tokyo. The Diet has passed legislation establishing a 
process for designating a new capital location. Several sites have been identified and are pres-
ently being considered. Whether the national government really intends to go forward with this 
proposal is unclear. TMG has argued strongly against this plan. The relocation is proposed as 
a solution to the over-concentration in Tokyo. The high degree of concentration makes the 
nation very vulnerable to a devastating earthquake that could wipe out both the economic 
center and political center of the nation. Additionally. major infrastructure and development 
projects have been a cornerstone of J apan's post-war economy. Relocation would entail major 
new construction projec 
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their work and undermine coherence of TMG policies as TMG (and prefects in general) organize 
functionally to match central government organization. To the extent that regional planning 
occurs. it is under the direction of the central government. Regional planning and decision 
making is unlikely to occur in TMG or the Summit unless the central government follows through 
on administrative reforms and decentralization plans thereby reducing the direction from above 
(interview). 
More than 30 years have passed since Professor Robson's (1967) study of TMG and as we saw 
earlier in the paper. his major criticisms are stil valid today including that there is 1) too much 
variation in the size of wards. 2) a lack of correspondence between TMG's boundaries and the 
boundaries of the Tokyo city-region. 3) litle rationale for a different system of local government 
in Tama than the central wards. and 4) insufficient financial resources are provided to TMG 
from the central government (chs. 3. 14). His solution was for greater centralization under a 
much enlarged first-tier metropolitan government. Peter Self (1996) characterizes Professor 
Robson as a “democratic rationalist" who great1y shaped scholarly discourse on metropolitan gov-
ernment in general but whose ideas “fai!ed in both London and Tokyo" (p.26). 
Professor Self is sympathetic to Robson's cal for a strong regional government. He even 
proposes a directly elected regional government for the larger 8 prefect capital region (p.28) 16). 
This government should have powers over regional planning. new towns. transportation. and 
preservation of green space. However. this would require setting up a government for a huge 
population. There are over 20 million people just in the three neighboring prefects. Since it is 
unlikely that the central government would ever agree to such a proposal， Self suggests a 
“hybrid form of regional government and planning" similar to the Region d'Ile de France that 
links central government and Paris officials in planning decisionsl7). Given the remoteness of 
such a regional government. Self proposes a newly reconstituted City of Tokyo government 
made up of the 23 wards alongside the creation of such a vast regional government. Otherwise. 
he believes it would be unlikely that citizens would have sufficient “civic consciousness and 
political interest" (p.30). 
7. Conclusion 
There has been a hollowing out of the central wards in Tokyo. although overall the Tokyo 
metropolitan area has been growing due to in-migration (see Takahashi and Sugiura 1996). These 
demographic changes raise questions about the adequacy of the current governing arrange-
ments for the metropolis. As large as TMG is. its boundaries do not cover the ful metropolitan 
region. Although current decentralization plans for TMG will enhance local control within the 
23 ku area. some wards are rather small to be fully autonomous municipalities and efficiently 
provide services. Chiyoda-ku for example has less than 40.000 residents. Other wards are 
rather large and may need to be decentralized themselves (seven wards have more than half a 
million residents). 
Today. there is litle rationale for differential treatment of the wards and Tama local govern-
ments. Under the present arrangements. the wards lack power but are rather wealthy and the 
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Tama cities， for the most part， are rather poor (in revenues) but have much greater municipal 
authority. The wards are to become like the Tama cities. However， they will stil get more 
favorable treatment because as the site of the capital， they receive special allocations. TMG 
partially addresses the inequities by providing supplemental grants to Tama cities. However， 
the economic difficulties and related fiscal stress being experienced by TMG has resulted in 
large cuts in grants to Tama cities in the last two fiscal years. Rather than eliminate the fiscal 
equalization in the wards as is likely as decentr.alization reforms take place， an argument could 
be made that the fiscal equalization should be extended to the Tama area (see Ito， 1998). There 
is no doubt that the wards will have enhanced local autonomy under planned reforms. Unfortu-
nately， the increased autonomy may be more i1usory than real. Since the revenues are unlikely 
to match the increased responsibilities the wards will stil be heavily dependent upon TMG and 
have difficulty meeting citizens' expectations. 
The changes may have other unanticipated consequences as well. The system of intergov-
ernmental relations in ]apan is based upon a consensual political culture. The existing political 
structure of TMG with the wards as subordinate internal administrative units facilitates cordial 
and cooperative relations among and between TMG and the ward offices. The increased munici-
pal autonomy may lead to increased conflict between TMG and the ward offices as the wards 
will be in a stronger position to challenge TMG priorities. This will be a much more charged 
political environment for Tokyo and ]apan， especially if other central government decentraliza-
tion policies are implemented leading to a stronger system of local government nationally. 
Other important reforms to improve governance in the Tokyo region have not been consid-
ered. In particular， the metropolitan region， Tokyo and its three neighboring prefects， lack an 
effective forum or institutional setting to cooperate on regional transportation and development 
policies. Tama area local governments， especially smaller ones， are struggling to provide mu-
nicipal services and may need greater assistance comparable to the wards' current relationship 
with TMG. And in al probability， boundaries of the wards will also have to be adjusted. 
Most discussion of metropol 
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impediments to consolidating counties in the U.S. parallel those to consolidating prefects in ]apan 18). 
In ]apan and Tokyo. the concern is how to create more local autonomy and devolve servIces. 
Present reforms to enhance ward authority probably do not go far enough. Real decentraliza-
tion will require TMG to give up its financial control over ward decisions. Clearly. more thought 
needs to be given to how to tie local (municipal) and regional (prefect) government together with 
greater emphasis on relations between prefects. The experience in the U.S. and Europe sug-
gests that the emphasis needs to be placed on facilitating cooperative relations (since adjust-
ment of boundaries is so dificult). However. the rhetoric concerning the benefits of“metropolitan 
governance without government" exceeds the record (Lefevre 1998). In the long run. sustained 
cooperation needs an institutional base (i.e. formal regional institutions or government). 
Until now. the debate over metropolitan government has been too narrowly focused between 
a public choice perspective and a consolidationist perspective. A new model of decentralized 
metropolitan governance is needed to better tie equity concerns with local autonomy and citizen 
responsiveness. Murray Bookchin (1995) cals for greater consideration of the idea of confederative 
schemes to bring about regional cooperation. The advantage here is that local polities are 
respected and civic consciousness is promoted. This idea has merit and deserves greater con-
sideration. This might help open up the debate over metropolitan government and lead to more 
innovative proposals for metropolitan governance that combine the advantages of decentraliza-
tion with those of centralization. 
Scholars such as Charles Beard and William Robson have long argued that city government 
should link the city and suburbs under one over-arching metropolitan government. A more 
recent concern has been that this leads to large. inefficient， and unresponsive bureaucracies. 
The public choice school has been effective in highlighting the problems of centralization. How-
ever. decentralization based upon the public choice market philosophy leads not to improved 
self-governance but a dereliction of governance. Peter Self brings a more pragmatic approach to 
metropolitan governance recognizing the need for regional government (centralization) but ques-
ti 
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more relevant to designing a metropolitan system of governance in the next century in Tokyo 
and around the world. 
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author gratefully acknowledges the guidance and assistance of Professors Shunji Fukuoka and 
Tokue Shibata in carrying out this study and the excellent translation services provided by Ms. 
Emily Shibata-Sato. An ear1ier version of this paper was presented at the American Political 
Science Association annual meeting， Boston， September 3 to September 6， 1998. 
Notes 
1) For an overview of the powers of local government in ]apan， see 1sozaki (1997). 
2) For an alternative perspective， see Muramatsu (1997) who argues that local governments in ]apan 
have a great deal of local autonomy. 
3) The First Special Administrative Reform Committee (1963) also made recommendations on reforming 
the administrative system of the capital city Tokyo. 
4) On Tokyo as a global city， see Sassen 1991. 
5) Between 1982 and 1992， office floor space went from 2219 ha to 3195 ha in the central downtown wards 
(Togo 1995， p.l81). 
6) About 32，000 persons live on the islands. 
7) The prefecture is comparable to a county government in the United States. Given Tokyo's primacy， 
the prefect takes on added importance as the capital city and the center of finance， economy， culture. 
However， itshould be remembered that ]apan is a unitary state and that there are no states or 
provmces. 
8) These three taxes account for about 40 percent of TMG's own source revenues (Shibata 1993， p.185). 
This has greatly bolstered TMG、srevenues and made it much less dependent upon the central gov-
ernment. Prefectures in ]apan obtain about 40 percent of their revenues from prefecture taxes， 
whereas TMG collects about 78 percent from its own taxes (including the municipal taxes in the 23 
wards) (Shibata 1993， p.185). TMG's revenues are also higher than other prefects because of the 
concentration of corporate offices and professional services in Tokyo. 
9) 1n ]apan. there are two distinct types of urban government systems each providing a different rela-
tionship between the prefecture and the municipalities. TMG and the special wards (To・seido)have a 
unique arrangement found only in the capital city. The second case is that found in the 12 Designated 
Cities. cities with more than 500，000 persons， and their home prefectures (Osaka. Kyoto， Nagoya. 
Yokohama， Kobe. Kitakyushu. Sapporo. Kawaskai. Fukuoka. Hiroshima. Sendai. and Chiba) (Council of 
Local Authorities for 1nternational Relations. 1997. p.44). 
10) This information is based upon a translation of sections of the Final Report on the Tokyo Ward 
System Reform (Draft) by Metropolitan-Ward Council. September 1994. 
1) At the time of the 1975 reform. the ward regained personnel management rights to select their own 
oficials. except for teachers. The current reforms extended this right to include teachers. 
12) Related to the capacity problem is the size of some 
Vogel : Redefining Community in a Global City 215 
mstttutlons. 
14) In the Tama area， the municipalities， towns， and villages provide this service. 
15) In the U.S.， collection of waste is‘considered a municipal service while disposal is usually thought to be 
a regional service best provided by a county or larger unit. 
16) Peter Selfs article，“London and Tokyo: Robson's Influence and Recent Developments in Two Great 
Cities"(1996) was written as a tribute to the Professor William Robson and his influence on the devel-
opment of London and Tokyo and their governance systems. 
17) Another approach is proposed by Professor Masamichi Royama (1965) who cal1s for a “governmen tal-
administrative system" to consolidate and coordinate regional administrative functions in the Tokyo 
reglOn. 
18) There is debate over whether prefectural consolidation is constitutional. In many states in the U.S.， 
consolidation of counties might require amending the state constitution as well. 
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世界都市東京の再考:21世紀の東京都政
ロナルド・ボーゲル
ルイピル大学政治学部
総合都市研究第69号 1999 p.20ト218
世界各地で大都市政府が弱体化したり解散に追い込まれている一方で、、東京都は統一自治体の典型例
としての地位を保っている。だがその東京都も岐路に立たされている。たとえば都の行政単位である特
別区は自治の拡大を要求しているが、国の政府は中央の権力を維持しつつも行財政は地方に移管しよう
と検討している。国土の均衡ある発展と一極集中防止対策の効果がさほど上がらない一方で、大都市圏
の拡大は進んで、いる。そして21世紀を目前にして、東京都は不況とそれに伴う財政難という問題に直面
している。
政府・自治体間関係の変化という東京の問題は、アメリカの大都市地域が直面する問題でもある。確
かに東京都は、単一国家でありアメリカとは文化も大きく異なる日本において行政を展開しているが、中
央集権化と分権化という 2つの圧力のせめぎあいという点では、アメリカの大都市地域も同じような状
況にあるのである。
東京の都市部の拡大は、都市の境界線の拡張を伴うものではなかった。現在の東京都は、都市の政府
としてはもはや大きすぎる。しかし都政では、依然として特別区に対する行政サーピスの提供に目が向
けられている。 23区の重視は一方で、多摩地域の各市町村の軽視につながりかねない。これら市町村は
自治体に義務づけられたサービス(東京都が23区内で提供しているもの)を提供しなければならないが、
23区とは異なり、都区財政調整制度の対象からははずれている。財政逼迫のおり、都からの補助金は多
摩地域の大多数の市町村にとって十分とはいえない。
同時に、大きすぎる東京都は、近隣3県を含む(首都圏8県に及ぶという説もある)真の意味での大
都市圏を統治するには小さすぎるとも言える。
戦後50年間続いてきた大都市行政制度を改革しようと、区、都、自治省、内問、国会では 10年近く
も調査や話し合いが続けられてきた。 1998年、都区制度改革の最終報告書が関係機関等の了承を得て、
関連法案が国会で可決された。改革では、現在は都が実施している清掃や都市計画などの事業が、 2000
年までに区に移管される。
だが改革が完全に実施されるかどうか、次のように疑問視する向きもある。1)区の受入れ体制が十分
かどうか。 2)権限委議が財政改革を伴うものかどうか。現在都が徴収して特別区に交付している金額を
大幅に引き上げる必要がある。しかし財政問題の検討は事業移管後へと先送りされており、しかも交付
額を決めるのは都である。 3)事業全ての移管が可能かどうか。区によっては自区内で清掃工場が確保で
きない、あるいは移管は民営化の促進と組合の弱体化につながるとして、清掃組合の反発も予想される。
都区制度改革に対する批判は、次の4点である。1)より上位の政府、特に都への財政依存が続くため、
特別区が完全な自治体として生まれ変わるかどうか大いに疑問である。特別区への期待が高まる一方で、
財源不足からサーピスの縮小という懸念もある。2)東京都の行政区分は、もはや実際の都市圏に適合し
たものではない。東京都の管轄地域の人口は、首都圏一都三県の3分のlにすぎない。改革を通じて、都
は市(区)へのサーピス提供という重荷から解放され、広域行政に専念できるようになり、従って地域
の決定権が強まるという期待もある。しかし都県の範囲を超えた地域全体について、どのような効果的
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な計画や決定を打ち出せるかについての検討や研究は先送りされている o3)改革は、特別区間、都、国
との間で歳入をどう分配し、どの政策を優先させるかについての対立激化という、予想し得ない結果と
なりかねない。アメリカでも政府聞の対立は大いに非難されているが、対立はアメリカの政治文化や、連
邦政府や合衆国憲法などの制度と相容れないものではない。しかし、単一制度で、政治においても合意
が重視される日本ではそうではない。 4)改革によっても、都の中における多摩地域の自治体と特別区と
の差は解消しない。
チャールズ・ピーアド、ウィリアム・ロブソンなどの学者は長年、 1つの広域的な大都市政府のもと
に都市と郊外部の双方を置くべきだと主張してきた。最近ではこれが、巨大で、非効率で、期待に応え
られない官僚制度につながると懸念されている。確かに公共選択学派は、集権化の問題に焦点をあてる
のに成功した。だが、公共選択市場学説に基づく分権化は、自治の拡充ではなく放棄につながる。
一方、ピーター・セルフは、地域政府(集権化)は必要だが、市民の意識を向上させる中核都市(分
権化)をなくす必要はないとする、より実際的な大都市行政を提唱した。さらに分権推進派のマリー・
ブックチンは、自治体連合こそが地域間協力を行う手段だとしつつ、さらに徹底的な分権を唱えている。
特別区の強化は分権化を加速させるだろうが、財政改革をともなわないとこの努力も無駄になってしま
つ。
この分野におけるピーアドやロプソンなどの古典的著書は、依然として都市のあり方や大都市行政を
理解する上で役立つものだ。そして問題ごとの処方筆の中にはまだあてはまるものもある(ロブソンが
提唱した区の規模、財政改革の必要性、特別区・市町村制度の廃止)。だが、都市圏行政のための統一大
都市政府という枠組みは、 21世紀を目前にした今日の都市社会にそぐわないもととなっている。今日、
大都市政府が失敗するのは、政治的な存立(または拡大)基盤を持ち得ないためである。さらに大都市
政府の領域は空間的に広がりすぎ、対象人口も多くなりすぎ、効率的な行政は望めなくなっている。今
後は、政府・自治体の縦横のつながりを強化するような新たな別の方法を模索し、市民へのアカウンタ
ピリティを向上させるような仕組みを強化すべきだろう。その意味においては、セルフとブックチンの
考え方の方が、来世紀の東京、そして世界各地の大都市の行政制度を構築する上で参考となると思われ
る。
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